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Action errors can occur when routine responses are triggered inappropriately by familiar cues. Here, EEG was recorded as vol-
unteers performed a “go/no-go” task of long duration that occasionally and unexpectedly required them to withhold a frequent,
routine response. EEG components locked to the onset of relevant go trials were sorted according to whether participants erro-
neously responded to immediately subsequent no-go trials or correctly withheld their responses. Errors were associated with a
significant relative reduction in the amplitude of the preceding P300, that is, a judgement could be made bout whether a response-
inhibition error was likely before it had actually occurred. Furthermore, fluctuations in P300 amplitude across the task formed a
reliable associate of individual error propensity, supporting its use as a marker of sustained control over action.
Copyright © 2007 Avijit Datta et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
“Absent-minded” slips of action often result from the inap-
propriate production of an automatic or routine response
[1]. Many of us will have repeatedly attempted to switch
on light bulbs that we “know” need replacing, or automat-
ically driven a familiar route when we were intending to go
elsewhere. Although routine activities may be skilfully per-
formed with little requirement for continuous control, there
are occasions when such unsupervised actions can have se-
rious consequences, from personal accidents to major disas-
ters [2]. Moreover, the tendency to make such action errors
significantly increases following traumatic brain injury, fo-
cal frontal lesions, and in some developmental disorders [3–
12]. Here we examine whether time-locked EEG components
may be sensitive to diﬀerent states in which such errors are
more or less likely to occur.
Slips of attention have been studied both in terms of pre-
dicting diﬃculties faced by clinical groups and in develop-
ing models of normal executive control over action. Norman
and Shallice [13] and Shallice [10], for example, proposed
an influential framework in which routine actions are con-
trolled in a relatively automatic or stimulus-driven manner.
Within this view, the expression of one behavioral sequence
rather than another is governed by a competitive process de-
termined by the strength of environmental triggers. Via such
a system, apparently complex activities such as those involved
in driving a car can be performed appropriately with lit-
tle requirement for higher-level control. The second level of
control, termed supervisory attention, is then proposed to
modulate action selection if, for example, the most active be-
havioral sequence is inappropriate in relation to an overall
goal. Such control is also experienced subjectively as eﬀort-
ful and conscious attention. More recently proposed frame-
works draw similar distinctions. Dehaene and Naccache [14],
for example, argue for a fronto-parietal circuit that acts as a
“global workspace,” regulating more routine processes and
which is associated with conscious eﬀort. One set of condi-
tions under which supervisory control is argued to be crucial
is that presented in sustained attention tasks. In such tasks,
the environmental triggers for goal-related behavior are re-
duced to a minimum, either by making the task “boring,”
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increasing the time over which a participant has to self-
maintain a readiness to respond, and/or increasing the dura-
tion beyond a point of tedium [15–17]. The more successful
a task is in reducing environmental support, the greater is its
emphasis on the internal, or “endogenous,” maintenance of
the appropriate processing stance.
Robertson et al. [9] developed a simple paradigm de-
signed to assess self-maintained attention to current action.
In the sustained attention to response task (SART), partic-
ipants’ watch-as-single digits are presented on a computer
screen at a regular, invariant rate. They are asked to press
a single button for each digit as it appears. The rhythmic
nature of this response, coupled with the lack of selection,
was designed to rapidly establish a relatively automatic, task-
driven response. Periodically and unpredictably, however, a
“no-go” target is presented to which no response should be
made. In order to maximize the chances of not making an
error, it has been argued, participants must try and counter
the tendency to lapse into routine responding and maintain a
high degree of control over action throughout the task. This
brief and reliable task has proved to be sensitive to the fre-
quency of everyday action lapses in traumatically brain in-
jured patients [9] and in neurologically healthy volunteers
[18].
The electroencephalogram (EEG) signal reflects brain ac-
tivity including that which is in response to a specific envi-
ronmental event. Such event-related responses are often dif-
ficult to separate from other activity on a trial-by-trial basis.
If time-locked signals to many identical events are averaged,
however, the unrelated signal tends to cancel out and the
event related potentials (ERPs) emerge. The electrophysio-
logical correlates of performance on tasks, such as the SART,
that emphasise alternation between responding and not re-
sponding (termed “go/no-go” tasks) have been extensively
examined [19–23]. The emphasis in such studies has been on
diﬀerential responses to the presentation of the no-go stimu-
lus relative to the go trial. Ma¨ntysalo [23], for example, found
increased amplitude of a negative component (N200) and a
positive component (P300) on no-go trials a feature subse-
quently interpreted by Kok [22], and by Eimer [19] as re-
flecting response-inhibition processes. Jackson et al. [20] also
found that the P300 component to the visual stimulus was
more rapidly suppressed during no-go trials. These studies
place emphasis on what happens after a “no-go” trial is pre-
sented. The focus here is on what happens before a no-go trial
is unexpectedly presented. If, as has been argued, the abil-
ity to control action on no-go trials is determined by a pre-
existing attentive state (sustained attention during the task),
then it may be possible to assess this independently of overt
behavior using ERP measures. Our hypothesis was that cor-
rect go trials that precede a correctly withheld response in a
no-go trial should show evidence of this heightened attentive
control relative to go trials that precede an error. A concep-
tual advantage of this approach lies in the degree to which
other factors that might influence the ERP are controlled. In
each case, the comparison is between correct go trials that
are identical in terms of the stimulus presented (go), the re-
sponse made (press), the instructional set (do not press for
no-gos), and the probability of a subsequent trial being a no-
go signal (1/8). If reliable diﬀerences emerge between trials
that precede an action slip and those that do not, this can
be interpreted with some confidence as being related to the
attentional state of the participant under which subsequent
errors are more or less likely.
There were cogent reasons for us to focus on the P300
ERP component as a likely predictor of errors in the SART
go/no-go tasks. The P300 is a positive wave occurring ap-
proximately in 300 milliseconds following stimulus presenta-
tion [24, 25]. In contrast to some earlier components within
the ERP, the P300 has been argued to reflect higher-level pro-
cesses that are sensitive to task context, such as attentive se-
lection [24, 26]. Increased P300 amplitude has been reported
when participants detect that they have made an error in
go/no-go tasks [27, 28], which may be interpreted in terms
of error detection or the consequent establishment of a more
attentional stance in which subsequent error probability is
reduced. Further, studies have shown that the P300 is signifi-
cantly reduced in survivors of traumatic brain injury, a group
who have particular diﬃculty in avoiding errors on the SART
[29–31].
In the current study, a group of neurologically healthy
volunteers performed multiple blocks of the SART task to es-
tablish whether variations in P300 amplitude were associated
with action errors in the SART. For each participant, the 250
no-go trials from the 10 blocks of the SART were first indexed
and sorted according to whether the participant had made a
commission error, by incorrectly pressing the response key,
or had correctly withheld the response. For each of these cat-
egories, the visual ERPs to go trials that immediately preceded
these no-go trials were then averaged first for each partici-
pant and then for the group of 25 participants as a whole.
From previous studies, we anticipated suﬃciently high error
rates in this group to allow a reasonable comparison between
events prior to a correct no-go trial and prior to an action
error.
Previous studies have shown that SART is relatively re-
liable in picking up enduring individual diﬀerences in er-
ror propensity. In addition to the hypothesis that relatively
high or low P300 amplitude would be associated at a within-
subject level with diﬀerent subsequent error rates, we there-
fore further hypothesized that individual diﬀerences in the
degree to which the P300 component was maintained across
all of the go trials would be associated with individual diﬀer-
ences in error rates.
For both analyses, there were advantages if gross individ-
ual diﬀerences in P300 amplitude (e.g., due to the quality of
electrode contact, skull thickness, etc.) could be reduced. To
this end, we expressed P300 in proportion to that of an ear-
lier ERP component, the P200 (P200 : P300 ratio). The P200
should be subject to the same intersubject diﬀerences aﬀect-
ing absolute amplitude but, in being thought to reflect more
perceptual aspects of the neural response, less likely to be
modulated by current attentional engagement with the task.
For this reasoning to be valid, it would be necessary to addi-
tionally demonstrate in the current task that variations in the
P300 are related to subsequent error while variations in the
P200 are not.
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The hypotheses can therefore be summarized as follows.
(1) Having first grouped no-go trials according to whether
or not an error occurred, the average amplitude of the
P300 on preceding go trials will vary in relation to the
outcome on those subsequent no-go trials. The earlier
and more perceptual P200 will not.
(2) If so, this will allow us to reduce gross between-subject
diﬀerences by expressing P300 amplitude relative to
that of the P200 (P200 : P300). Averaged across the
group, we then predict that the “normalized” P300
value will diﬀer between go-trials preceding an error
and those preceding a correct no-go trial.
(3) In addition to those go trials that immediately precede
no-go trials, we would expect the degree to which the
normalized P300 amplitude is maintained across the
task as a whole to reflect error rates. Specifically, in a
correlational analysis, the mean normalized P300 am-
plitude (P200 : P300) across all go trials will be associ-
ated with individual diﬀerences in error propensity.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Participants
Following ethical committee approval, 25 neurologically
healthy right-handed volunteers (13 women and 12 men, age
range 20–47) gave informed consent for their participation
in the study.
2.2. Electrophysiological recording and averaging
EEG recordings were made from 3 midline sites (Fz, Cz,
Pz) using silver/silver chloride electrodes (Grass). Four ad-
ditional electrodes were applied for eye blink and move-
ment monitoring, grounding, and reference. The electrodes
were referenced to the right mastoid during recording. The
horizontal electro-oculogram electrodes were referenced to
each other. The EEG and EOG signals were amplified with
a bandwidth of 0.05–100 Hz. The digitization rate for the
analogue-to-digital conversion was 500 samples per second.
Prior to averaging, artefact rejection was performed on the
data to discard epochs in which amplifier saturation, eye
movements, blinks or excessive muscle, or movement arte-
facts occurred. The same rejection criteria were used for all
participants. In some cases, the rejection values for eye arte-
facts were individually adjusted, to correct for individual
diﬀerences in amplitudes of artefacts and EEG. This proce-
dure resulted in an average rejection of no more than 2% of
the trials for each of the 25 subjects included in the analy-
sis. Electromyogram signals (EMG) in the responding hand
were monitored using bipolar silver/silver chloride electrodes
from an index finger flexor (first dorsal interosseous mus-
cle) and an index finger extensor (extensor indicis). EEG
was amplified 20 000 fold, EMG 1000 fold, and EOG 2000
fold using AC coupled amplifiers (Biopac Systems Inc., Santa
Barbara). Filtering was 10 Hz–5 KHz, 1–35 Hz, and 0.05 Hz–
100 Hz for EMG, EEG, and EOG, respectively. Full-wave rec-
tification of the EMG was performed digitally. All data was
digitized at 500 Hz, indexed for go, no-go stimulus, correct
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Figure 1: Selection of trials for the main comparison. Each figure
represents the sequence of events in the SART where go trials are de-
fined by any digit between 1 and 9 (except 3) and the no-go target
by the 3. In each sequence, the participant is responding correctly
to go trials. In the upper panel, the presentation of the target is fol-
lowed by a correctly withheld response. In the lower panel, by an
error, the correct go trials prior to these no-go signals (highlighted)
form the basis of the comparison.
and incorrect response, archived, and averaged oﬄine using a
purpose-written averaging program. For stimulus-locked av-
erages, the P300 was defined as the maximum positive peak
amplitude between 250–450 milliseconds after stimulus pre-
sentation. Latencies of peaks were clearly identifiable in each
case.
2.3. Behavioral task: the sustained attention
to response test
The task [32] was presented on a Dell Latitude laptop com-
puter isolated from the mains supply. On each trial, a sin-
gle digit (1–9) was selected at random and presented for
250 milliseconds, followed by a mask for 900 milliseconds,
at the center of the 185 mm × 245 mm screen. Participants,
who were at a comfortable viewing distance from the screen
(around 40 cm), were asked to press a mouse button with the
index finger of their preferred hand as quickly as possible af-
ter each digit presented, with the exception of 3, to which no
response should be made. They were asked to press the but-
ton “as quickly but as accurately as possible” following the
onset of the trial. The randomization meant that 25 no-go
trials (3 seconds) appeared unpredictably amid 200 go trials
(all digits other than 3) in each block. Each participant com-
pleted 10 blocks with the opportunity to rest from the task
between each.
Testing took place in a quiet, darkened room that was free
from distraction. The total testing session, including setting
up and removing the recording electrodes, lasted for approx-
imately 3 hours. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events in
the task and the two types of go trial (defined by immedi-
ately subsequent no-go trial error) that inform the main ERP
comparison of this study.
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3. RESULTS
3.1. Performance on the task
The participants completed 10 blocks of the SART, compris-
ing 2000 go trials and 250 (11.1%) randomly intermixed
no-go targets. The participants correctly withheld their re-
sponses to 147.72 (59%) of the 250 no-go trials (SD 16.12)
and made errors of commission on an average of 102.28
(41%) of these trials (SD 16.105). As is common, errors of
omission (i.e., not pressing the response key on go trials) were
very rare, occurring on an average of 0.55 of the 2000 go trials
(0.061%, SD 0.17%).
3.2. ERPs to the visual stimulus prior to a correct
no-go trial and prior to an action error
Previous behavioral studies with the SART suggest that, other
than in severely brain injured individuals, correct responses
on no-go trials are likely to outweigh errors of commission.
As reported above, this was the case with the healthy par-
ticipants tested here. Correct responses accounted for about
60% of the no-go trials with around 40% attracting action er-
rors. This error rate is somewhat highly compared with pre-
vious studies and may be related to the presentation of 10
consecutive blocks, rather than the more conventional single
block. This higher rate is, however, to our advantage in com-
paring pre-error and pre-correct go trials. With both cate-
gories yielding between 80 and 170 trials per person (pre-
error mean = 102.28, SD 16.11, range 80–147, pre-correct
mean = 147.72, SD 16.10, range 103–170), there are suﬃ-
cient numbers for noise to tend towards zero in the averaged
signals for each participant in both categories, with these
values then being again averaged across the group. Any dif-
ferences between the waveforms should not therefore be at-
tributable to a disparity between the overall number of error
and correct trials. However, the risk of this unlikely confound
is further reduced by our focus on a single wave, the P300,
as the component that should show a diﬀerence. If it is the
P300 which is indeed diﬀerent while other components are
broadly equivalent, it is less likely that diﬀerential amounts
of noise, which would be distributed across the signal, would
have such a specific eﬀect.
The Pz ERPs for go trials before an error and before a
correct response suppression are presented in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2(a) shows the pattern that preceded a correct no-go
trial while Figure 2(b) shows the pattern preceding an action
error. Each panel shows (from top to bottom) averaged recti-
fied agonist and antagonist muscle electromyogram (EMG),
averaged scalp electroencephalogram (EEG; at Pz), and av-
eraged electrooculogram (EOG; used in controlling for eye
movements).
In both Figures 2(a) and 2(b), a triphasic response is ob-
served in Pz EEG with peaks of each wave occurring at sim-
ilar latencies (270 milliseconds, 384 milliseconds, and 544
milliseconds in Figure 2(a), and 250 milliseconds, 388 mil-
liseconds, and 542 milliseconds in Figure 2(b)). The ampli-
tude and latency of the positivity between 200–300 millisec-
onds after the onset of the trial (P200) is strikingly similar to
the two trial types. Given that these go trials are eﬀectively
identical, other than in what subsequently happens, it is per-
haps not surprising that the early perceptual components of
the ERPs are so similar. As discussed above, we therefore ex-
ploited this stable feature in order to allow a comparison of
the P300 components that was relatively free from the influ-
ence of noise and inter-subject variables such as signal inten-
sity. The amplitude of the P300 component was therefore ex-
pressed as a ratio of the P200 amplitude for each participant
averaged across the two trial “types” illustrated in Figure 1.
Comparison of the P300/P200 ratio between trials pre-
ceding an action error (mean 0.92, SD 0.33, n = 25) and trials
preceding correct withholding of the response (mean 1.28,
SD 0.48) reveals a robust and statistically significant diﬀer-
ence (t(24) = 3.63, P < .001). Moreover, Figure 3 shows that
the median P300/P200 ratio prior to an action error falls be-
low even the interquartile range of the P300/P200 prior to a
correct no-go trial.
In both Figures 2(a) and 2(b), EOG traces are flat un-
til 600 milliseconds after presentation of the visual stimulus.
This lack of contamination of eye movement allows confi-
dent interpretation of EEG traces and P300/P200 ratios that
we have obtained. Although similar responses were seen at
Cz and Fz sites, these were less compelling in magnitude and
did not reach statistical significance for this group size. For
brevity we will therefore focus on the Pz results in subsequent
analyses (see later for discussion).
In summary, in two groups of go trials which are identical
other than in what occurs on the subsequent no-go trial, there
appears to be a diﬀerence reflected in the P300 at Pz which
is related to the probability of a subsequent error. When this
amplitude is relatively low, errors are more likely. For reasons
outlined in the introduction, therefore, it is tempting to ar-
gue that this component is reflecting some form of enhanced
attention to the stimulus/task which makes errors less likely.
3.3. Individual differences in error propensity
In the previous section we considered only those go-trials
that immediately preceded no-go trials. If it is the case, as
the results suggest, that an increased P300 amplitude is asso-
ciated with more attention and fewer errors, it might be ex-
pected that the mean value of this marker across the whole
task could reflect an individual’s capacity to maintain an
attentive state and overall “resistance” to inhibition errors.
To examine this, we examined the Pearson correlation be-
tween each participant’s (averaged) normalized P300 ampli-
tude across all of the 2000 go trials in the task and their over-
all commission error rates on no-go trials.
The relationship was statistically significant (Pearson’s r
= −0.46, P < .05), the lower the relative average amplitude
of the P300, the more action lapses a particular participant
was prone to make. This relationship is further illustrated by
the division of the participants into “high” and “low” rela-
tive P300 groups based on a median split. As can be seen in
Figure 4, 12 participants with low Pz P300/P200 ratio values
(between 0.34 and 1.07) had a mean error rate of 47% (SD
15.4%) while 13 participants with high Pz P300/P200 ratio
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Figure 2: The diﬀerence between go trials preceding a correct or erroneous no-go trial. Each figure shows EEG (at Pz), finger muscle activity
(extensor/flexor), and eye movements (left and right) averaged across all available relevant trials. The crucial diﬀerence between these go
trials appears to be in the amplitude of the P300 ERP peak, highlighted in the grey band.
values (between 1.09 and 2.25) made significantly fewer er-
rors (32.5% (SD 13.4%); t(23) = 2.51, P = .02).
3.4. Error detection and reaction time effects
So far we have seen that a reduced relative amplitude of the
Pz P300 is associated with a higher probability of an error
on a subsequent no-go trial and, over all of the go trials in
the task, associated with increased no-go error propensity.
We have so far interpreted this in terms of reflecting waning
attention to the stimulus and task. However, before we can
do that with confidence, there are a couple of potential con-
founds that should be addressed. These are “contamination”
of our go trial ERPs with processes related to the detection of
a previous error and the possibility that trials preceding errors
had rather diﬀerent reaction times to those preceding correct
no-go trials.
The SART is a continuous task. If one has a high over-
all rate of errors on no-go trials, it is more probable that any
given go trial might have occurred after a previous error, as
well as possibly preceding other errors. If one made errors on
100% of no-go trials, for example, all but the first go trials
may be considered to have “followed” an error. This is im-
portant because increases in the P300 have been associated
with error detection, albeit that this is a feature that appears
to be relatively short lived in the ERP trace [27, 28, 33]. It is
possible, therefore, that the relationships so far reported be-
tween Pz P300 amplitude and subsequent error and overall
error rates are mediated by error detection factors, although
it should be noted that, were this the case, the direction of
this relationship would be reversed (more errors = higher
P300 amplitude). To examine this possibility, we compared
the mean Pz P300/P200 ratio for those go trials that immedi-
ately preceded no-go trials, with the average for all go trials.
Go trials that occur immediately before a no-go trial tend, by
definition, to be as distant from a previous no-go trial as it
is possible to be within the task and are therefore less likely
to be influenced by error detection processes triggered by
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Figure 3: The diﬀerence between go trials preceding a correct or er-
roneous no-go trial. The figure shows a boxplot for the P300 : P200
amplitude ratio for the two “types” of go trial. Each shows the me-
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for the 25 volunteers. Prior to a correct no-go trial, the median nor-
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Figure 4: Propensity to error is associated with the maintenance of
the P300 : P200 ratio across the task. The boxplot shows error fre-
quencies for participants with high or low mean P300 values (de-
fined by a median split of the total participant group), respectively.
a previous mishap. If our previously reported correlation was
substantially due to error-detection processes, we would ex-
pect the relationship between the P300 amplitude in these tri-
als and overall error rates to be reduced. In fact, if anything,
it was enhanced (Pearson’s r = 0.57, P < .01).
Finally, we investigated whether the predictive qualities
of the normalized Pz P300 may be mediated by reaction time
(RT) diﬀerences. The relationship between mean RT to go
stimuli and error rates across subjects did not, however, reach
statistical significance (r = −0.281, P = .174), meaning that,
in this group, we could not predict errors on the basis of how
fast individuals were responding. In addition, there was no
relationship between mean RT of participants and mean am-
plitude of their normalized P300 response (r = 0.1, P = .455,
n = 25), further suggesting that the relationship between in-
dividual error propensity and P300 amplitude was not medi-
ated by response speed diﬀerences.
4. DISCUSSION
In this study, we asked participants to perform a simple
go/no-go tasks in which no-go targets appeared infrequently
and unpredictably within a random sequence. Previous re-
search has suggested that this task is sensitive to everyday ab-
sentminded lapses in people with brain-injuries and healthy
participants. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
success on no-go trials is related to how well people are
able to maintain active attentive control over their responses,
rather than allowing them to be “driven along” by the repeti-
tive, regular pacing. The basis for this study was that, if there
is a fluctuating state of attention allocation in which errors
are sometimes more probable and sometimes less, we might
be able to see this within fluctuating electrophysiological sig-
nal before the critical no-go target has even appeared.
The results were consistent with this view. From the ran-
dom sequence of trials in the task, we first found go trials
that happened to have occurred before a no-go trial. We then
divided these into those that had been followed by a correct
response suppression and those that had been followed by an
error. The EEG was then averaged for each grouping, time-
locked to trial onset. It is again important to stress that, from
the participants’ perspective, trials preceding no-go signals
hold no special status, indeed, any given go trial is around 8
times more likely to be followed by another go trial than a no-
go trial. The ERPs on go trials had a characteristic triphasic
pattern. Given that the trials are perceptually indistinguish-
able, it was not surprising that the early perceptual response
in the EEG was similar whether the go trial occurred before
an error or a correct no-go trial. A substantial diﬀerence was,
however, apparent in the P300. When its amplitude was rel-
atively low, it was associated with increased errors on subse-
quent no-go trials. When its amplitude was relatively high,
participants were more likely to succeed in withholding their
responses on subsequent no-go trials. As might be expected
from this finding, the degree to which the amplitude of the
P300 was maintained across the task was associated with in-
dividual error propensity among the participants.
It seems, therefore, that the P300 formed an electrophys-
iological marker of something that is probabilistically asso-
ciated with subsequent error. It is tempting to view this as a
fluctuating “top-down” goal-directed signal which, if it could
speak, would be saying things like “watch out, don’t press
on the no-go trial, don’t get distracted, keep focusing on the
task, and so forth.” However, the averaging of the ERPs to
the onset of each trial makes it less likely that we are directly
sampling the intensity of such a signal. Instead, we are more
probably detecting the consequence of that maintained stance
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in the attention/decision making allocation to each digit. In
the SART, the really important presented digit is the one
nominated as the no-go target. The others just mean that the
current trial is not a no-go target and, when no-go trials are
rare, arguably this encourages a stance in which evaluation
becomes rather scant (and in which commission errors are
more likely). This would be reflected in the reduced P300 to
each digit presentation. The influence of a maintained goal-
directed stance would be to resist this and encourage more
active trial-by-trial decision making about the response with
reference to the digit. This would be reflected in increased
digit-onset locked P300 amplitude. The results are therefore
consistent with many previous studies associating the P300
with increased attention to a particular stimulus (e.g., [19–
23, 32]). The novel feature or argument here is in the relation
of this individual stimulus processing to some more gener-
ally maintained executive stance to the task. More simply, it
might be expressed as If there is a good attention at trial n
(high P300), then it is more likely that there will be good at-
tention at trial n + 1—which will be particularly useful if it
happens to be a no-go trial.
There are a number of confounds or diﬀerent interpreta-
tions of these findings which we have attempted to address.
The first is that the results are an artefact of the diﬀerent
number of pre-error and pre-correct trials delivered to us
by the participants. The actual number of trials contribut-
ing to the averages was, however, relatively high (between 80
and 147 for pre-error trials and between 103 and 170 for pre-
correct trials). The averaging process should, therefore, have
had a reasonable opportunity to reduce the contribution of
random noise to near zero levels, and therefore a diﬀerential
contribution of noise to the comparison should be minimal.
In addition, and assuming that noise would be temporally as
well as randomly distributed, the inference is strengthened
by our focus on the P300 and the lack of marked diﬀerence
in other components within the ERPs. Finally, in this respect,
we further minimized the risk by expressing the magnitude
of the P300 as a ratio of the P200. This process should fur-
ther cancel any noise diﬀerence (in that the P200 should be
equally susceptible) as well as oﬀering other advantages in
terms of normalizing the response. A second concern was
that the P300 association with error was mediated by pre-
vious error detection. The observations that error detection
has generally been associated with an increase in P300 (rather
than the decrease that we see here associated with more er-
rors), and that the “error-signal” is a rather short-lived phe-
nomenon [34–36] both suggest that this account is unlikely.
Furthermore, by comparing the correlation with overall er-
ror rates in go trials that immediately preceded no-go tri-
als (which are as “far as you can get” from a previous no-go
trial and hence error) with go trials in general, we found the
P300 magnitude was increased, not decreased, with remote-
ness from an error. Finally, we found no significant diﬀer-
ences in reaction times that could account for the results.
Despite this, we still need to be cautious. The statistically
significant diﬀerences and correlations that we report are all
from the Pz region. Although they were broadly in a con-
sistent direction, the diﬀerences at Cz and Fz were less im-
pressive. However, the site of biggest ERP signal diﬀerence
may not be obviously connected to the origins of that dif-
ference and it seems improbable that the prefrontal cortex is
not in some way involved in the allocation and maintenance
of attention [32, 37–40]. It is also true that a plethora of
functional imaging and other results now suggest that pari-
etal regions tend to be coactivated with those of the dorso-
and ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex in tasks requiring eﬀort-
ful or conscious processing [14]. While the current study may
have little to say about the location(s) of the sources of the
observed ERP diﬀerences, other studies may be more use-
ful guides. Robertson et al. [32] examined ERP correlates of
go no-go task performance in head-injured and healthy par-
ticipants. As with our study, they found no significant dif-
ferences between no-go and visually identical go trials in the
early perceptual components in the ERP (up to and including
the 200 milliseconds bin) in either group. For the healthy par-
ticipants, increased amplitude at P300 did diﬀerentiate the
trial types and was interpreted by the authors as reflecting in-
creased attention and/or the launching of an inhibitory signal
to prevent a response. In this respect, the healthy participants
showed a greater diﬀerential response to no-go trials than the
patient group, which may be reflected in their relatively lower
error rates. Interestingly, in terms of our current discussion,
Roche et al. identified two components in their P300. The
P300 was reported to be maximal at the frontal electrode
site whilst the slightly later P300b was of greater magnitude
and most apparent at the Pz site. It is possible to question
whether the common coactivation of frontal and parietal re-
gions in eﬀortful tasks which is commonly seen in functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies reflects the si-
multaneous engagement of a large distributed network or
whether, for example, parietal activity may be a secondary
consequence of frontal activation. The combination of the
good temporal resolution of ERPs and the spatial resolution
of fMRI may be necessary to further address this question.
Electrophysiological measures such as this provide one
route out of the conceptual circularity inherent in some
purely behavioral analyses. Errors on the SART have previ-
ously been attributed to the poor maintenance of attention
with that poor maintenance being marked by the occurrence
of the error. This is a reasonable but circular argument that
requires additional measures such as the frequency of atten-
tion problems in everyday life, self-reports of “task unrelated
thought” propensity, and the eﬀect of cues to maintain atten-
tion, if it is to be sustained [41]. An alternative, though not
mutually exclusive, account might emphasise response inhi-
bition eﬃciency as contributing towards errors in the task.
Following Logan et al. [42] we might therefore view success
or failure on a no-go trial as depending upon the outcome of
a race between the erroneous “go” response and an inhibitory
signal launched at the start of the trial. We would know if
the internal “stop!” signal was a good or poor competitor
based on the number of errors made and we would explain
the number of errors made based on the hypothetical speed
of this signal. Again, independent measures of response in-
hibition from other tasks or from everyday life would be re-
quired to avoid circularity. The advantage of the electrophys-
iological approach used here is that we can see that there is
some influence at work before the critical no-go trial has been
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presented. Whether or not a race model is accurate or ap-
propriate (and there are good reasons to believe it is both),
the results suggest that there is something in place biasing the
odds of that race before it has begun. This seems to chime
with everyday experience of inhibitory failures. Returning to
the light bulb example, if one enters the dark room thinking
“Concentrate. . . habit tells you to switch on the light but you
know that, in this case, it will not help!”, then—with luck—
the action error is less likely.
This issue is not trivial as there are, as discussed, many
clinical groups said to suﬀer from inhibitory deficits. In ad-
dition to the possibility of tweaking the eﬃciency of in-
hibitory control, perhaps pharmacologically, the results sug-
gest that other interventions could serve to reduce the con-
sequences of inhibitory diﬃculty. These would include pro-
grams designed to help people recognize situations in which
a more attentive stance might oﬀset inhibitory slips, training
in maintaining such a stance, and the use of cues to externally
support such maintenance when necessary. These programs
would have application in rehabilitation of neurological pa-
tients and also assist situations where prolonged vigilance
is vital such as in industrial or military scenarios. Although
tasks such as the SART may be somewhat artificial models
of aspects of everyday situations, their value lies in allowing
close, controlled analysis of cognitive failures and, therefore,
in refining understanding and evaluating interventions. They
are also, in their repetitive structured way, compatible with
the averaging over multiple similar events necessary for ERP
analysis. We conclude that identifying EEG markers, such as
the P300, which appear to reflect a well maintained top-down
stance to a task therefore has multiple potential benefits in
predicting and preventing potentially catastrophic errors in
civilian and military life.
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